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NOT *,//-TY: CHALLENGING AND PROVIDING
A WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE TO THE SUPREME
COURT’S GERRYMANDERING STANDING
ANALYSIS IN *,//9:+,7)25'
Colin Neal*

INTRODUCTION
In Gill v. Whitford, the Supreme Court denied standing to a group of Wisconsin
voters challenging the partisan gerrymander entrenching Republican politicians by
“cracking” and “packing” Democratic voters to increase safe Republican seats.1 In
an opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court unanimously determined
that the voters had not sufficiently shown their votes were diluted by being “packed”
or “cracked” in their specific districts.2
In a concurrence joined by three other members of the Court, Justice Kagan laid
out her theory of a First Amendment freedom of association claim that she believes
may provide a separate, albeit more attenuated, standing claim.3 Justice Kagan wrote
that “an active member of the Democratic Party in Wisconsin who resides in a
district that a partisan gerrymander has left untouched” may not have his vote directly diluted by the gerrymander, “[b]ut if the gerrymander ravaged the party he
works to support, then he indeed suffers harm, as do all other involved members of
that party.”4 Per Justice Kagan, this is an associational harm sufficient to create
standing to challenge a statewide districting plan, regardless of an individual voter’s
“packed” or “cracked” status.5 Analyzing both the Gill majority opinion and Justice
Kagan’s concurrence, this Note argues that the distinction of harms between vote
* JD Candidate, William & Mary Law School 2020. BA, University of Virginia, 2017.
I would like to thank my friends and family for listening to me rave about partisan gerrymandering and serving as a sounding board for this Note. I would also like to extend a special
thank you to Professors Tara Grove and Rebecca Green for their instruction and guidance
in taking this Note from a fledgling office hours idea into a published article.
1
138 S. Ct. 1916, 1920 (2018). The term “pack” refers to “concentrating one party’s
backers in a few districts that they win by overwhelming margins,” and the term “crack” refers
to “dividing a party’s supporters among multiples districts so that they fall short of a majority
in each one.” Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and
remanded by 138 S. Ct. 1916.
2
138 S. Ct. at 1920–21.
3
See id. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring).
4
Id. at 1938.
5
See id. (explaining that the First Amendment associational harms to a plaintiff are distinct from his individual vote dilution injury).
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dilution and freedom of association is a flawed formalistic division employed by the
Court. The thesis of this Note is that the right to vote, in regards to partisan gerrymandering, is necessarily a right of both equal protection and association that emanates
from the individual—not the organization—and extends beyond a single district.
Supreme Court standing doctrine in regards to partisan gerrymandering should reflect as such.
The Supreme Court has erroneously treated partisan gerrymandering harm like
the harm from racial vote dilution under the Voting Rights Act.6 This has—perhaps
with good reason—given the Court fear of entering the “political thicket”7 of
partisan gerrymandering with the same rigor with which it stepped into state legislatures to right the wrongs of racial vote dilution.8 This Note provides an alternative
theory of harm to voters who live in partisan gerrymandered states. The AndersonBurdick test, which courts have employed in a variety of voting rights cases,9 is the
proper means of analysis for determining statewide standing for partisan gerrymandering cases. This test considers an interwoven injury to a plaintiff’s First and
Fourteenth Amendment rights, adequately considering the complex ways in which
partisan gerrymanders violate a voter’s constitutional rights.10
Rather than dodge the issue of partisan gerrymandering by requiring unnecessarily
high hurdles for district-by-district injury—or, by Justice Kagan’s theory, harm for
partisan activists—the Court should acknowledge that gerrymandering affects each
“individual’s right to vote and his right to associate with others for political ends,”11
and should redefine its standing analysis of such claims to reflect this standard.
In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Rucho v. Common Cause, handed
down in June of 2019, partisan gerrymandering claims are no longer a justiciable constitutional question in the federal courts.12 In reaching this decision, the Court has
passed on the opportunity to weigh in on an issue that directly affects the weight of
an individual’s vote—an issue that strikes at the heart of American democracy. This
Note does not grapple with the political question doctrine; however, Rucho does not
weaken the thrust of this Note for three principal reasons. First, the recommendations
6

See, e.g., Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 109 (1986) (holding that claims of vote
dilution as a result of partisan gerrymandering are justiciable). But see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267, 281 (2004) (plurality opinion) (writing for the opinion of the Court, Justice Scalia
determined that there was no judicially manageable standard to determine when partisans
have had their votes diluted).
7
See Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
8
See generally Avi Frey, Note, Manipulated Doctrines, Improper Distinctions, and the
Law of Racial Vote Dilution, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 343 (2008) (discussing the
variety of difficult questions with which the Court has grappled in the field of racial vote
dilution and racial gerrymandering).
9
See Daniel P. Tokaji, Voting Is Association, 43 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763, 777–80 (2016).
10
Id. at 763.
11
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
12
139 S. Ct. 2484, 2506–07 (2019).
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of this Note stand insofar as state courts rely upon rules of standing from the Supreme Court and federal law, generally.13 Furthermore, the states have traditionally
been more lenient in granting standing, especially in regards to core questions of public interest.14 Second, should the Court revisit the question of the constitutional
justiciability of partisan gerrymandering,15 the analysis provided in this Note may
offer a pathway towards a more coherent standing jurisprudence for statewide partisan gerrymandering claims. Finally, the injury analysis and test proposed in Part
IV16 may provide some guidance to Congress should it seek to enact a statutory ban
on partisan gerrymandering in the states.17 To survive judicial scrutiny, a congressionally enacted cause of action for statewide partisan gerrymandering claims will
likely need to articulate some form of injury, such as that proposed in this Note. As
such, this Note focuses purely on the Gill v. Whitford holding and the injuries identified in partisan gerrymandering, as these injuries exist whether a gerrymandering
challenge is brought in state or federal court. In sum, rather than grappling with the
new law elucidated in Rucho, this Note concentrates solely on standing for partisan
gerrymandering claims.
In Part I, this Note provides a survey of standing doctrine and the way the Court
has defined injuries in voting rights claims.18 Part II addresses the Gill v. Whitford
lawsuit’s history, up to and including the two opinions issued by the Supreme Court
remanding the case.19 Part III challenges the theories of partisan gerrymandering
standing proposed by both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan.20 Part IV proposes a new theory of partisan gerrymandering rooted in the Anderson-Burdick First
and Fourteenth Amendment harm analysis.21 Lastly, Part V considers two challenges
to the use of the Anderson-Burdick test.22
13

See generally Wyatt Sassman, A Survey of Constitutional Standing in State Courts, 8
KY. EQUINE, AGRIC., & NAT. RESOURCES L. 349 (2015–2016).
14
See Peter N. Salib & David K. Suska, The Federal-State Standing Gap: How to Enforce
Federal Law in Federal Court Without Article III Standing, 26 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1155,
1169–73 (2018) (explaining that there are typically three tiers of state standing scrutiny: no
cognizable requirements, sufficient adversity, and public interest requirements).
15
Given the Court’s fairly rapid change in position on the justiciability of partisan gerrymandering from Bandemer to Vieth, and most recently in Rucho, a further reconsideration
is not outlandish. See discussion infra Section I.B.
16
See discussion infra Part IV.
17
For a comprehensive catalog of bills considered and passed by the 116th Congress
considering partisan gerrymandering, redistricting commissions, and other election law reforms,
see Congressional Redistricting Bills—116th Congress, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 23,
2019), https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-solutions/congressional-redistricting
-bills-116th-congress [https://perma.cc/7S9R-XYCR].
18
See discussion infra Part I.
19
See discussion infra Part II.
20
See discussion infra Part III.
21
See discussion infra Part IV.
22
See discussion infra Part V.
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I. STANDING DOCTRINE AND ITS APPLICATION TO PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING
A. Standing Doctrine Generally
The Supreme Court modernized the standing doctrine in the eras of the Burger
and early Rehnquist Courts as a means to manage the federal docket in regards to
frivolous lawsuits.23 In the watershed 1992 case Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, the
Court, speaking through Justice Scalia, plainly explained the centrality of standing
doctrine to Article III adjudication: standing is necessary for a dispute to be a “case”
or “controversy” justiciable by the federal courts.24 The Court established three necessary elements of standing: (1) injury in fact, which is “concrete and particularized”
and “actual or imminent”; (2) causation that is “fairly traceable” between alleged conduct and injury; and (3) redressability, the notion that the courts can “likely” redress
this injury via some remedy at law or equity.25 In addition, “[t]he party invoking federal
jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.”26
In subsequent cases, the Court established the bounds of the injury element. The
Court clarified that a plaintiff’s alleged injury cannot be abstract, generalized, or based
on a special interest in a particular issue,27 nor can the injury be a general interest in enforcing the law or the Constitution,28 but the harm must actually affect the plaintiff
bringing the suit.29 The crux of the injury-in-fact requirement emanates from the question of whether the plaintiff has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the
controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation
of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.”30
B. Injury and Vote Dilution
The standing framework for voting rights claims stems from the seminal case of
Baker v. Carr.31 In Baker, the plaintiffs brought an Equal Protection Clause challenge
23

Scott Michelman, Who Can Sue over Government Surveillance?, 57 UCLA L. REV.
71, 110 (2009).
24
504 U.S. 555, 559–60 (1992).
25
Id. at 560–61.
26
Id. at 561.
27
See Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972) (holding that an environmental
group does not have general standing to sue for environmental issues just because its core
goal is environmental advocacy).
28
See United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 175 (1974) (holding that a plaintiff lacks
standing to compel the government to comply with a constitutional mandate in regards to the
taxing and spending power).
29
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401–02 (2013). Additionally, the
Court has averred from manufactured injury in order to satisfy this standing requirement. See
id. at 402.
30
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
31
See id. at 187–88.
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to a Tennessee law that apportioned the state legislature’s seats by county, which
greatly diluted the representation of urban voters.32 The Court plainly found that the
Tennessee urban voters had standing: “[V]oters who allege facts showing disadvantage to themselves as individuals have standing to sue.”33 The Baker plaintiffs demonstrated standing because they were classified in a way that disadvantaged them in the
electoral system, as compared to Tennessee voters in more rural areas.34 Just two years
later in Reynolds v. Sims, the Court reiterated and clarified the doctrine of “one person,
one vote” when it held that “an individual’s right to vote for state legislators is unconstitutionally impaired when its weight is in a substantial fashion diluted when
compared with votes of citizens living in other parts of the State.”35 Voting is an individual right, held the Reynolds Court, and a “legislative apportionment scheme [that]
constitutes an invidious discrimination [in violation of] the Equal Protection Clause”
is one that “impair[s] [rights] individual and personal in nature.”36 In these two cases,
the Court established the centrality of vote dilution in asserting injury to voting rights
claims under the Equal Protection Clause. Following Baker and Reynolds, voting rights
cases were often based on a concern that “[o]verweighting and overvaluation of the
votes of those living here has the certain effect of dilution and undervaluation of the
votes of those living there.”37 The vote dilution concern not only reached legislative apportionment questions generally, but became the backbone of many unconstitutional
racial districting claims under the Equal Protection Clause and the Voting Rights Act.38
In Davis v. Bandemer, the first major case the Court faced regarding partisan
gerrymandering vote dilution, a majority of the Court determined that partisan gerrymandering claims are justiciable under the Equal Protection Clause,39 but it provided
a splintered answer on what degree and form of injury a plaintiff must show in order
to bring such a claim.40 A plurality of the justices rejected the district court’s finding
that “any interference with an opportunity to elect a representative of one’s choice
would be sufficient to allege or make out an equal protection violation,”41 but rather,
32

Id.
Id. at 206.
34
Id. at 207–08.
35
377 U.S. 533, 568 (1964).
36
Id. at 561.
37
Id. at 563.
38
See generally Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1 (2009); League of United Latin Am.
Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658–75 (1993)
(White, J., dissenting); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30 (1986); City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446
U.S. 55 (1980); United Jewish Orgs. of Williamsburgh, Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977).
39
478 U.S. 109, 125 (1986) (plurality opinion); id. at 143.
40
See id. at 129–31 (Burger, C.J., concurring); id. at 185 (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also Allison J. Riggs & Anita S. Earls, “The Only Clear Limitation
on Improper Districting Practices”: Using the One-Person, One-Vote Principle to Combat
Partisan Gerrymandering, 12 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 29 (2017) (describing how
the splintered Bandemer opinion made for a morass of problems for plaintiffs).
41
Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 133.
33
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the plurality agreed with Justice White that “in order to succeed the Bandemer plaintiffs were required to prove both intentional discrimination against an identifiable
political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”42 Per the plurality,
to show this discrimination by vote dilution, plaintiffs were required to leap the high
hurdle of demonstrating that “a particular group has been unconstitutionally denied
its chance to effectively influence the political process.”43
Because this standard proved unworkable in the lower federal courts,44 eighteen
years later in Vieth v. Jubelirer, the Court revisited whether partisan gerrymandering
claims were at all justiciable.45 The Vieth plurality found the case nonjusticiable,46
but a separate concurrence by Justice Kennedy preserved the possibility of a future
standard coming before the Court.47 Justice Kennedy suggested that a standard may
arise that could rest upon “a conclusion that the [law’s use of political] classifications, though generally permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way
unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective.”48 Justice Kennedy’s concurrence
contemplated a First Amendment cause of action for future partisan gerrymandering
plaintiffs, musing that partisan line drawing “penaliz[es] citizens because of their
participation in the electoral process, their voting history, their association with a
political party, or their expression of political views.”49 Though this standard has yet
to be adopted by the Court, it has not gone unnoticed by legal scholars.50
C. Other Voting Rights Injuries Recognized by the Court
The cause of action perhaps most similar to the associational rights at question in
partisan gerrymandering conflicts are those rights as observed in the Anderson-Burdick
42

Id. at 127.
Id. at 132–33.
44
Easha Anand, Comment, Finding a Path Through the Political Thicket: In Defense of
Partisan Gerrymandering’s Justiciability, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 917, 933–35 (2014) (cataloging
the ways in which district courts struggled to apply Bandemer to any alleged gerrymander).
45
See 541 U.S. 267, 271–72 (2004) (plurality opinion); Riggs & Earls, supra note 40, at 29.
46
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 305–06.
47
Id. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48
Id. at 307.
49
Id. at 314.
50
See G. Michael Parsons, The Institutional Case for Partisan Gerrymandering Claims,
2017 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVO 155, 157 (suggesting that a future coherent doctrine for partisan gerrymandering claims may arise from the Fourteenth or First Amendments); see also
David Schultz, The Party’s Over: Partisan Gerrymandering and the First Amendment, 36
CAP. U. L. REV. 1, 2 (2007) (arguing that the First Amendment is the proper cause of action
in partisan gerrymandering claims because there is no state interest in restricting speech in
such a way); Timothy D. Caum II, Note, Partisan Gerrymandering Challenges in Light of
Vieth v. Jubelirer: A First Amendment Alternative, 15 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 287, 289
(2005) (discussing the simpler avenue of litigation via the First Amendment).
43
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line of cases.51 These cases focus primarily on the statewide claims for associational
rights of parties and their access to ballots, but the test utilized in these disputes has
also been applied to determine the constitutionality of voter identification laws.52
The Anderson-Burdick analysis rejects subjecting each state election regulation to
strict scrutiny: the requirement that the law advance a compelling state interest and
be narrowly tailored to further that interest.53 Rather, the test recognizes that states
have a constitutional delegation of power over elections and that any regulation in
furtherance of that electoral power will necessarily place some burden on the right
to vote or the right to associate.54 The Anderson-Burdick test balances the magnitude
of injury upon voters’ First and Fourteenth Amendment rights against state interests
in regulating the election process.55 To measure the degree of injury—the first prong
of the standing analysis56—the Burdick Court acknowledged two classes of injury:
“severe” and “reasonable.”57 Severe burdens are analyzed like a typical strict scrutiny
case.58 The Court distinguishes severe burdens from those “impos[ing] only ‘reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions’ upon the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights
of voters” whereby state interests are generally subject only to deferential rational
basis scrutiny.59
The Anderson-Burdick cases focus on an injury distinct from that in the Supreme
Court’s partisan gerrymandering jurisprudence because they blend both First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment burdens.60 For instance, in discussing Williams v.
Rhodes, an earlier case analyzing the concern of burdening voters based on party
affiliation, the Anderson-Burdick Court reproduced a quote which illustrated this
blended understanding of injury:
In the present situation the state laws place burdens on two different, although overlapping, kinds of rights—the right of individuals
to associate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right
of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to
51

Tokaji, supra note 9, at 764.
See id. at 763.
53
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 432–33 (1992).
54
Id.
55
Id. at 434.
56
See discussion supra Section I.A.
57
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
58
Id.
59
Id. (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983)). The Court has applied
this deferential standard to voter identification cases analyzed under the Constitution, finding
that the “burden of acquiring, possessing, and showing a free photo identification is simply
not severe, because it does not even represent a significant increase over the usual burdens
of voting.” Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 209 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (internal quotations omitted).
60
Tokaji, supra note 9, at 765–66.
52
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cast their votes effectively. Both of these rights, of course, rank
among our most precious freedoms.61
The Court goes on to explain how the restriction of ballot access for political candidates diminishes the efficacy of some voters to voice their political opinions in
meaningful ways: “As we have repeatedly recognized, voters can assert their preferences only through candidates or parties or both. ‘It is to be expected that a voter hopes
to find on the ballot a candidate who comes near to reflecting his policy preferences
on contemporary issues.’”62
The Court has used this standard to strike down laws it finds to be burdens both
on candidate and voters, whose interests are often too intertwined to separate their
injuries.63 The Court has never gone so far as to use the Anderson-Burdick standard
to define voting as speech, but it has clearly expressed a concern for the associative
rights of voters.64
II. GILL V. WHITFORD
Pursuant to its decennial census in 2010,65 the Wisconsin state legislature, controlled by Republicans, sought to redraw the districts for both the Wisconsin House
of Representatives and Wisconsin Senate via Act 43.66 The Wisconsin Constitution
binds the state redistricting plan “by county, precinct, town or ward lines, to consist
of contiguous territory and be in as compact form as practicable.”67 Federal law also
dictates that Wisconsin’s state legislature must respect the Supreme Court mandate
of “one person, one vote,” and any districting plan must comport with section 2 of
the Voting Rights Act, which requires the preservation of minority voting power.68
The legislature delegated the work of redistricting to staff members of the House
Speaker and Senate Majority leader, as well as the law firm Michael Best & Freidrich.69
A significant focus of this redistricting team was the use of “customized demographic data” to determine the partisan makeup of the state’s voters.70 The eventual
map the team submitted to the legislature was designed via the partisan demographic
61

Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968)).
Id. (quoting Lubin v. Panish, 415 U.S. 709, 716 (1974)).
63
See id. at 786.
64
Tokaji, supra note 9, at 771–75 (discussing the history of the Supreme Court “flirt[ing]”
with holding the right to vote to be a First Amendment right through an exploration of cases as
disparate as Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), and NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)).
65
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
66
See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 853 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and remanded
by 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
67
WIS. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
68
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 844–45.
69
Id. at 846–47.
70
See id. at 848.
62
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data and was drawn so that “the Republicans could expect to win 59 Assembly seats,
with 38 safe Republican seats, 14 leaning Republican, 10 swing, 4 leaning Democratic, and 33 safe Democratic seats.”71 Republican Governor Scott Walker, who
presided over the first Republican-unified government in Wisconsin in forty years,72
signed the Act into law in 2011.73
The map has lived up to its partisan design. In 2012, the first full election cycle
in Act 43’s lifespan, Republicans won sixty seats in the House and eighteen in the
Senate, compared to Democrats’ thirty-nine and fifteen seats, respectively.74 The map
continued to be effective in 2014, where Republicans increased their hold in the lower
chamber to sixty-three seats to Democrats’ thirty-four.75 In the State Senate, Republicans increased their hold on the body to nineteen seats.76 The 2016 election saw
Republicans continue to increase their monopoly on the legislature with a sixty-four
to thirty-five seat advantage in the Assembly and a twenty to thirteen seat advantage
in the Senate.77 In the 2018 election, Republicans maintained a sixty-three to thirtysix seat majority in the Assembly and a nineteen to fourteen majority in the Senate.78
A. The Plaintiffs’ Claim of Partisan Gerrymandering
The plaintiffs in Whitford v. Gill were thirteen Democratic voters in the state of
Wisconsin alleging that the practice of the state legislature in Act 43 was to “pack”
(“concentrating one party’s backers in a few districts that they win by overwhelming
margins”) and “crack” (“dividing a party’s supporters among multiple districts so
that they fall short of a majority in each one”) Democratic votes so as “to dilute [their
71

Id. at 851.
Id. at 846.
73
Id. at 853.
74
See Wisconsin State Assembly Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org
/Wisconsin_State_Assembly_elections,_2012 [https://perma.cc/A3V4-Z9QS] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2020); Wisconsin State Senate Elections, 2012, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia
.org/Wisconsin_State_Senate_elections,_2012 [https://perma.cc/3T6K-2XWL] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2020).
75
See Wisconsin State Assembly Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org
/Wisconsin_State_Assembly_elections,_2014 [https://perma.cc/V9MJ-Z3MP] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2020).
76
Wisconsin State Senate Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wiscon
sin_State_Senate_elections,_2014 [https://perma.cc/9ZMH-HDAU] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
77
See Wisconsin State Assembly Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org
/Wisconsin_State_Assembly_elections,_2016 [https://perma.cc/463H-SSAC] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2020); Wisconsin State Senate Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia
.org/Wisconsin_State_Senate_elections,_2016 [https://perma.cc/92R5-25MU] (last visited
Feb. 24, 2020).
78
Wisconsin State Assembly Elections, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wis
consin_State_Assembly_elections,_2018 [https://perma.cc/C226-9U4S] (last visited Feb. 24,
2020); Wisconsin State Senate Elections, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Wiscon
sin_State_Senate_elections,_2018 [https://perma.cc/GFW5-XN7F] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020).
72
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power] statewide.”79 The plaintiffs put forth the novel concept of the “efficiency gap,”
a means of measuring “the discriminatory effect of political gerrymanders.”80 “The efficiency gap is the difference between the parties’ respective wasted votes in an election,
divided by the total number of votes cast.”81 This test excited academics and was accepted by the three-judge district court panel hearing the case, as it provided a potential
solution to the workable standard problem plaguing the courts since Bandemer.82
The district court found that the Whitford plaintiffs had standing to challenge Act
43.83 Democratic voters suffered an Equal Protection Clause injury, said the district
court, because the entrenchment effect of Act 43 reduced the efficacy of Democratic
voters for the lifespan of the map.84 The district court relied on the difficulty of legislating in the Wisconsin state government without a majority coalition in finding an Equal
Protection Clause injury.85 Summing up the plaintiffs’ harm, the district court wrote
that “erecting a barrier that prevents the plaintiffs’ party of choice from commanding
a legislative majority diminishes the value of the plaintiffs’ votes in a very significant
way.”86 That injury is analogous to the unfair system of representation in Baker v.
Carr, reasoned the court.87 Next, the district court found an obvious causal connection between Act 43 and the effect of Republican entrenchment to the dismay of
Democratic voters.88 Lastly, a favorable decision by the court would certainly result
in a map giving Democrats the opportunity to elect a governing coalition; the court
pointed to the other maps deemed less aggressively Republican that the districting
team could have selected, which had less “packing” and “cracking” of Democrats.89
The district court found the Act 43 map unconstitutional in November 2016.90 On
February 24, 2017, the State of Wisconsin asked the U.S. Supreme Court to review
the district court’s decision.91 The Court was bound to review the three-judge panel,
79

Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 854 (W.D. Wis. 2016), vacated and remanded
by 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
80
Id.
81
Id. (citation omitted).
82
Id. at 903–06; see Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Essay, The Measure
of a Metric: The Debate over Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1503,
1503 (2018); see also Benjamin Plener Cover, Quantifying Partisan Gerrymandering: An
Evaluation of the Efficiency Gap Proposal, 70 STAN. L. REV. 1131, 1131–32 (2018); Nicholas
O. Stephanopoulos, The Causes and Consequences of Gerrymandering, 59 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2115, 2115 (2018).
83
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 856.
84
Id. at 927.
85
Id.
86
Id. at 927–28.
87
Id. at 928.
88
Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 63–76.
89
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 928.
90
See id. at 838.
91
Gill v. Whitford, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (July 3, 2018), https://www.brennancenter
.org/our-work/court_case/gill-v-whitford [https://perma.cc/7CTF-UCE4].
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and heard oral argument on October 3, 2017.92 On June 18, 2018, the Court, in a 9–0
decision, held that the plaintiffs lacked standing to bring a claim of partisan gerrymandering.93 Chief Justice Roberts wrote for a five-justice majority, joined by Justices
Kennedy, Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch.94 Justice Kagan filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment, which was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Sotomayor.95
B. The Majority’s Standing Analysis
Chief Justice Roberts’s opinion for the majority of the Court began by invoking
Baker and Reynolds to establish that “a person’s right to vote is ‘individual and personal in nature.’”96 Building from that precedential proposition, the Court reasoned
that “[t]o the extent that the plaintiffs’ alleged harm is the dilution of their votes, that
injury is district specific.”97 So much as there is injury to voters in partisan gerrymandering claims, it is a harm that stretches as far as the district boundaries, but no
further.98 The Court distinguished a claim by these plaintiffs from those in Baker v.
Carr, in which the apportionment law was stricken statewide because the remedy
to an unconstitutional gerrymander is the redrawing of each individual district
deemed invalid.99 In this sense, the Court compared partisan gerrymandering with
racial vote dilution. Citing recent precedent, the Court noted that to make a claim of
racial gerrymandering, a plaintiff must show that they are in a district that has been
impermissibly drawn and may only receive a remedy on a “district-by-district” basis.100
The Court further expressed distaste for the Efficiency Gap standard. The Court
acknowledged that the math associated with the Efficiency Gap may very well be
accurate, but because the calculation fails to acknowledge the discrete circumstances
of different plaintiffs, it fails to satisfy the individualism requirement that voting
rights claims require.101
92

See generally Mark Tushnet, The Mandatory Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court—Some
Recent Developments, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 347 (1977) (discussing the history and constitutional
theories of the Supreme Court’s mandatory jurisdiction for appeals arising from three-judge
district court panels).
93
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1920 (2018).
94
Id. at 1922.
95
Id.
96
Id. at 1929 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964)).
97
Id. at 1930.
98
See id.
99
See id. at 1921 (“[R]emedying the harm does not necessarily require restructuring all
of the State’s legislative districts. It requires revising only such districts as are necessary to
reshape the voter’s district.”).
100
Id. at 1930 (quoting Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265
(2015)).
101
Id. at 1933.
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The Court also rejected the plaintiffs’ statewide-injury claims.102 Plaintiffs claimed
that Act 43 inflicted “harm to their interest ‘in their collective representation in the
legislature,’ and in influencing the legislature’s overall ‘composition and policymaking.’”103 This argument failed to persuade Chief Justice Roberts and the majority.104
This alleged injury, held the Court, was a generalized interest in the conduct of government that each citizen holds in common, but lacked particularization to a certain class
of plaintiffs different from the citizenry at whole.105 Having determined that there was
no statewide Equal Protection Clause injury for partisan gerrymandering and that the
plaintiffs failed to show that their votes were individually “packed” or “cracked,” the
Court remanded the case for the plaintiffs to make a showing of standing.106
C. Justice Kagan’s Concurrence
According to Justice Kagan, Chief Justice Roberts and the Court’s majority put
forth an adequate theory of standing for partisan gerrymandering, but their construction was not the sole injury plaintiffs could show.107 According to Justice Kagan’s
concurrence, “[p]artisan gerrymandering no doubt burdens individual votes, but it
also causes other harms,” such as the specific harm she focuses on: “[A]n infringement of [voters’] First Amendment right of association.”108 Justice Kagan agreed that
the plaintiffs failed to show injury under the traditional vote dilution framework,109
but her concurrence aimed to provide the plaintiffs—and future litigants in partisan
gerrymandering cases—an alternative means to a statewide judicial remedy.110
Justice Kagan attempted to provide a means of admitting statewide evidence of
partisan gerrymandering in vote dilution claims, as the plaintiffs brought here.111 She
noted that the plaintiffs alleged that the Republican government sought to make the
State Assembly as Republican as possible, and to do so it necessarily enacted a plan
that effectuated pro-Republican seats in as many districts as possible.112 With the
goal of maximizing Republican power on the legislature as a whole, the districting
plan’s partisan tint trickled down to individual districts.113 Therefore, a statewide
102

Id. at 1931.
Id. (quoting Brief for Appellees at 31, Gill, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (No. 16-1161), 2017 WL
3726003).
104
See id.
105
See id.
106
Id. at 1934.
107
See id. (Kagan, J., concurring).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 1936.
110
See id. at 1934.
111
Id. at 1934–37.
112
See id. at 1937.
113
See id.
103

2020]

NOT GILL-TY

843

plan had regional and district effects, so, like in racial gerrymandering cases, the
Court should consider statewide evidence.114
Having established that, even in vote dilution claims, the Court should admit
statewide evidence, Justice Kagan set out to establish a vehicle by which plaintiffs
can show statewide injury—and thus be awarded a statewide remedy—if the districting plan can be shown to infringe upon their First Amendment rights.115 Among
the potential parties that could demonstrate this injury, posits Justice Kagan, are
“[political] parties, other political organizations, and their members.”116 Justice Kagan
further contemplated that an active member of a given political party may have a
special cognizable injury, even when residing in a non-gerrymandered district, if the
gerrymander “ravaged the party he works to support.”117 This plaintiff, she reasoned,
has standing based on harm distinct from that of the average voter.118 Standing “turns
on the nature and source of the claim asserted,” and the harm of vote dilution is
distinct from that of the infringement of associational rights. 119 Ultimately, Justice
Kagan determined that the plaintiffs failed to adequately plead an associational
harm, but she noted that the Court left open “for another day consideration of other
possible theories of harm” arising from partisan gerrymanders which may “give[ ] rise
to statewide remedies.”120
III. THE FAILURES OF THE MAJORITY AND CONCURRENCE STANDING THEORIES
Although the ultimate aim of this Note is to propose a new theory of standing
for the Court to apply to partisan gerrymandering cases, to do so without illustrating
the failures of the current system would be a disservice. This Part challenges the standing theories proposed in Gill v. Whitford by Chief Justice Roberts in his majority
opinion and Justice Kagan’s four-Justice concurrence. Section A argues that basing
a partisan gerrymandering claim on vote dilution, as is done in racial claims, ignores
the reality of partisan gerrymandering—there is a necessary associational right and
that right necessarily extends beyond a single district.121 Section B demonstrates that
Justice Kagan’s alternative theory of injury for partisan activists is too high a bar.122
One need not show that they have done some extra degree of work to create associational injury; this proposed nexus of activism and injury is at odds with the Court’s
distaste for manufactured injury.123 Therefore, Justice Kagan’s requisite for standing
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123

Id. (citing Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2015)).
See id. at 1938.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1938–39 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)).
Id. at 1939–40 (quoting id. at 1931 (majority opinion)).
See discussion infra Section III.A.
See discussion infra Section III.B.
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013).
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injury is incompatible with the principles of Article III standing because it asks
plaintiffs to make their own injury before they ask the Court to remedy the harm.
Upon demonstrating the failures of the two injury-in-fact standing theories put forth
in Gill v. Whitford, Part IV provides an alternative to these flawed models.124
A. The Equal Protection “Vote Dilution” Standing Theory
The Gill majority’s standing analysis, as described above,125 is flawed in two
regards. First, in comparing partisan gerrymandering claims to racial vote dilution,
the Court fails to acknowledge a necessary component of racial vote dilution claims
that is inherent in partisan vote dilution: the existence of a voting bloc. The inherent
partisan bloc ought to make it easier, not harder, to make a partisan claim in that
regard. Second, the Court’s holding that partisan gerrymanders do not extend beyond the districts in which partisans are packed or cracked ignores the necessarily
statewide impact of a single district’s drawing.
1. Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering
Expressing the crux of the Gill majority’s distaste for the plaintiffs’ claim of
injury, Chief Justice Roberts emphatically stated, “[T]his Court is not responsible
for vindicating generalized partisan preferences. The Court’s constitutionally prescribed role is to vindicate the individual rights of the people appearing before it.”126
This quote, which caps the Court’s discussion of the Gill plaintiffs’ lack of standing,127 aptly shows the false equivalence the Court draws between racial vote dilution
and partisan gerrymandering. These forms of unequal voter treatment practices
differ in a number of brightly obvious ways. First, racial vote dilution claims are
predicated on the vote dilution injury that emanates from the Thornburg v. Gingles
test.128 That inquiry requires the showing of (1) a large and cohesive minority, sufficient to make a single-member district majority; (2) a politically cohesive minority; and (3) the fact that the opposing majority acts as a cohesive bloc to defeat the
minority.129 Should a racial minority satisfy these three requirements, they may bring
a claim under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.130 Though racial gerrymandering
cases differ from a Gingles-esque vote dilution question, the underlying question in
racial gerrymandering cases remains whether race was a factor in the legislature to
dilute the electoral effect of racial minorities.131 Unlike racial vote dilution
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

See discussion infra Part IV.
See supra text accompanying notes 94–104.
Gill v. Whitford, 183 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018).
See id.
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 56 (1986).
Id.
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 914 (1996).
Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1266–67 (2015) (explaining
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plaintiffs,132 partisans should not need to show that they have the electoral cohesion
to demonstrate that the packing or cracking of partisans tends to result in the failure
to elect a fairly proportional amount of partisans. Given the increased polarization
in American politics and the ease with which map-drawers are able to use electoral
data to predict which voters will vote with which party, there is little argument for
state legislatures that they could not predict the cohesion of partisan voters.133
Partisan gerrymandering differs from racial vote dilution in another, admittedly
obvious, way: in a two-party system, partisans of both parties tend to have a sufficiently large voting bloc to elect governing majorities in many states.134 Contrast the
size of partisan voting blocs to racial voting blocs135 and the Court’s comparison of
the two continues to crumble.
Lastly, racial vote dilution differs from partisan gerrymandering in the injury
that results from each. In racial vote dilution, the racial minority loses its power to
elect a representative that can advocate for the interests of that group.136 In partisan
gerrymandering, the voters of the party packed and cracked lose their power to
govern even when a great majority of voters express agreement with its causes and
positions at the ballot box.137 Consider the following metaphor that demonstrates the
that Alabama’s practice of maintaining the same percentage of racial minorities in each
minority-majority district had the effect of using race as a primary factor in districting, which
had the effect of minimizing the voice of racial minorities as their portion of the population
grew); see also Vann R. Newkirk II, The Supreme Court Finds North Carolina’s Racial
Gerrymandering Unconstitutional, ATLANTIC (May 22, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com
/politics/archive/2017/05/north-carolina-gerrymandering/527592/ [https://perma.cc/84NW
-X3RA].
132
See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos, Race, Place, and Power, 68 STAN. L. REV. 1323,
1349–61 (2016) (analyzing the history and dynamics of racially polarized voting since Gingles).
133
See PEW RES. CTR., POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE AMERICAN PUBLIC 6–16 (June 12,
2014) (demonstrating how American voters have become more reliably liberal or conservative); Stephen Ornes, Science and Culture: Math Tools Send Legislators Back to the Drawing
Board, PNAS (June 26, 2018), https://www.pnas.org/content/115/26/6515 [https://perma.cc
/B9FF-2XU3].
134
See generally Annual State Legislative Competitiveness Report: Vol. 8, 2018, BALLOTPEDIA, https://ballotpedia.org/Annual_State_Legislative_Competitiveness_Report:_Vol._8,
_2018 [https://perma.cc/S3LN-7L63] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) [hereinafter 2018 Competitiveness Report].
135
Compare Party Affiliation, GALLUP, https://news.gallup.com/poll/15370/party-affili
ation.aspx [https://perma.cc/T9WP-ZV9E] (last visited Feb. 24, 2020) (showing that party
affiliation among American citizens has stayed between 20–38% for each party since 2004),
with Quick Facts, United States, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2017), https://www.census
.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/US/PST045217 [https://perma.cc/MXD9-R6CN] (indicating that the
largest racial bloc was Hispanic or Latino, at 18.3%, Black and African Americans constituted
13.4% of the population, and non-Hispanic whites made up 60.4% of the population).
136
See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 34 (1986).
137
See Robin I. Mordfin, Proving Partisan Gerrymandering with the Efficiency Gap, U.
CHI. L. SCH. (Sept. 25, 2017), https://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/proving-partisan-gerry
mandering-efficiency-gap [https://perma.cc/U5M9-QFGA].

846

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:831

difference between racial vote dilution and partisan gerrymandering: Eight people are
rowing in a boat. One of them loses her paddle in whitewater. As a result, she no longer
has the ability to row for herself. But the harm does not end with the individual rower.
Now, the seven other rowers on the boat have to increase their effort to make up for the
loss of one of their members’ ability to row. Voting is similar. When one district is gerrymandered in a way to make a partisan group’s vote less efficacious, it necessarily
puts pressure on partisans in other districts. In order to create a governing coalition,
those voters must exercise their voices with more fervor to effectuate the policies
their faction prefers. On the other hand, racial vote dilution is like the rower who lost
her paddle. She (representing the racial minority in a jurisdiction) lost the ability to
advocate for herself, but the other rowers still have the power to row. Though the result
of racial vote dilution may be that a minority may lose its power to choose its own representative in a given geographic area, there may be others in the legislature sympathetic to the cause of the minority which has been disenfranchised by vote dilution.
Admittedly, there is some merit in the comparison between unconstitutional racebased voting laws and partisan gerrymandering. Though the two forms of line drawing
have their distinct differences, the Court has acknowledged an injury in racial gerrymandering that does have some relation to partisan gerrymandering: the injury of
being subjected to unjust classification.138 Like in racially gerrymandered claims,
Wisconsin voters represented by the Gill plaintiffs were subject to invidious classifications based on their voting preferences.139 The legislative staffers and the law firm
appointed and hired by the Wisconsin State Legislature used electoral data to determine
which voters preferred which candidates in order to minimize the representation of
Democratic voters in the legislature.140 Democratic voters, while not the statutorily protected class that black citizens are,141 were systematically classified and targeted on
the basis of their ideological preference.142 Racial minorities and partisans thus share the
harm of unconstitutional classification when they are subject to invidious gerrymanders.
Notwithstanding the similarities between impermissible racial voting laws and
partisan gerrymandering in regards to classification injury, the differences between
the two demonstrate that they should not be treated as analogous. Partisan gerrymandering overcomes the cohesion question of racial vote dilution claims,143 partisan
line drawing extends well beyond the individual districts in which the voters have
been cracked or packed because of the number of citizens who are predictable
138

Ala. Legislative Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1265 (2015).
Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 911–12 (W.D. Wis. 2016) (finding that the Wisconsin districting law applied political classifications in “a way unrelated to any legitimate legislative objective” (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 351 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part))), vacated and remanded by 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).
140
Id. at 890–96.
141
See Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 34.
142
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 890–96.
143
Thornburg, 478 U.S. at 56.
139
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partisans,144 and a primary injury suffered by partisans reaches beyond dilution to
their ability to govern.145
2. District-by-District Injury
The second failure of Chief Justice Roberts’s partisan gerrymandering standing
theory in Gill is that it relies on the declaration that the harm of a partisan gerrymander ends at the borders of the district packed or cracked.146 This presupposition
ignores the reality of gerrymandering and the way in which it affects a state as a
whole.147 Here again, the Chief Justice compared the remedy of partisan gerrymandering to the remedy of racial gerrymandering: the redrawing of a single offending
district.148 This is a glaringly unsatisfactory comparison. Racial gerrymandering generally involves a single offending district which can be remedied with the redrawing
of that district,149 whereas a partisan gerrymandered district exists in the ecosystem
of a gerrymandered state where the line-drawers have acted in a way to most effectively
benefit their party statewide.150 In partisan gerrymandering, states, not individual
districts, are the macro-level targets of line-drawers.151
B. Justice Kagan’s Associational Harm Theory
This analysis must begin by noting the ways in which Justice Kagan’s standing
analysis improves on the rigid formula set forth in the majority. First, Justice Kagan
steps back to acknowledge the ways in which a gerrymandered districting plan affects
the state as a whole, not limiting the effect to individual districts operating in a political
and electoral vacuum.152 Justice Kagan also begins with the presupposition that the First
144

See Stephanopoulos, supra note 132; 2018 Competitiveness Report, supra note 134.
Whitford, 218 F. Supp. 3d at 927–28.
146
See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1930 (2018).
147
See Ginger Strand, Among the Gerrymandered, PAC. STANDARD (Feb. 22, 2019),
https://psmag.com/magazine/among-the-gerrymandered [https://perma.cc/8RAX-ULA2] (noting that a small districting shift can ripple across the state to affect the partisan makeup of
other districts).
148
See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1930 (“[A] plaintiff’s remedy must be ‘limited to the inadequacy
that produced [his] injury in fact.’” (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 357 (1996))).
149
See generally Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541 (1999) (concerning North Carolina’s
12th Congressional District).
150
See sources cited infra notes 163–64.
151
See Christopher Ingraham, How Maryland Democrats Pulled Off Their Aggressive
Gerrymander, WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2018, 1:23 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/news/wonk/wp/2018/03/28/how-maryland-democrats-pulled-off-their-aggressive-gerry
mander/?utm_term=.5fd547eabd2e [https://perma.cc/QQ7F-693M].
152
See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1936–37 (Kagan, J., concurring); see also discussion supra
Section II.C.
145
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Amendment bars the infringement of one’s right to associate because state actors
disagree with the viewpoint or content of that association’s speech.153 Of course, it is
also necessary to note that Justice Kagan’s concurrence adheres to the majority’s concept that vote dilution is district-specific; the flaw of such a misunderstanding of a
state’s electoral landscape has been fleshed out above and need not be repeated here.154
Notwithstanding the improvements Justice Kagan makes upon the majority’s
standing formula, there are still flaws specific to her analysis of the plaintiffs’ injury.
These flaws arise from Justice Kagan’s determination that First Amendment associational harms are necessarily distinct from vote dilution injury. The concurrence
determines that “the associational injury flowing from a statewide partisan gerrymander, whether alleged by a party member or the party itself, has nothing to do
with the packing or cracking of any single district’s lines.”155 Justice Kagan falls into
the trap of electoral naivety that plagues the majority opinion when she adopts this
formalist injury distinction. Mere lines after Justice Kagan acknowledged that the
goal of a partisan gerrymander is to maximize the number of legislative seats held
by a specific party, she reverted to the majority’s formalist view that each state
district exists separate from another.156 Like the majority, this ignores the way the
state electoral ecosystem interacts in a political context. Furthermore, this distinction
fails to acknowledge the ways in which voting is an acutely individual and intimate
right.157 In sum, the distinction proposed by Justice Kagan faces issues on both sides
of the “electoral injury coin.”
1. Vote Dilution Causes Associational Injury
Contrary to what Justice Kagan asserted, “the associational injury flowing from
a statewide partisan gerrymander” is a necessary result of successful “packing or cracking of any single district’s lines.”158 This all stems from the purpose of a partisan
gerrymander: to limit the effectiveness of the opposition party’s voters while maximizing one’s own party’s electoral successes.159 Once again, the Court fails to understand this logical step because it, whether expressly or implicitly, draws inferential
connections between partisan and racial vote dilution. In the context of partisan
gerrymandering, there tends to be a more equal split between consistent partisans than
there is a split between racial groups in racial vote dilution cases.160 Furthermore,
153

Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1939 (Kagan, J., concurring).
See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
155
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1939 (Kagan, J., concurring).
156
Id. at 1930 (majority opinion).
157
See Joseph Fishkin, Equal Citizenship and the Individual Right to Vote, 86 IND. L.J.
1289, 1298–1330 (2011).
158
Contra Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1939 (Kagan, J., concurring).
159
See Strand, supra note 147 (“[G]errymandering means legislators draw maps that make
their own party’s votes count more than the opposition’s.”).
160
See sources cited supra note 135.
154
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there tends to be a more equal statewide distribution of voters along the political
spectrum than those of different racial groups.161 As stated above, the goal of these
two styles of electoral manipulation is sufficiently different that the Court should be
incredibly wary about drawing logical inferences between the two.162 A partisan
gerrymander tends to be most advantageous and effective when applied to the state
as a whole, rather than an individual district.163 This is why the Wisconsin legislature,
as well as other states accused of partisan gerrymandering, have drawn maps that
scientifically work to maximize partisan representation in the state or federal legislature across the districts.164 Vote dilution in partisan gerrymandering is thus part
of a statewide scheme in which individual districts are mere instruments to a statewide
goal of electoral success and entrenchment.165
Upon implementing a partisan gerrymandered map, a state proceeds to discriminate against voters’, parties’, and political organizations’ associational rights.166 The
First Amendment is thus implicated only once a partisan map proves to be effective.167
Justice Kagan attempts to draw a line erecting a barrier between the two harms,168
when in reality the only line that should be drawn between the harms of vote dilution and associational injury is a straight arrow from the former leading to the latter.
161

See sources cited supra note 135 (showing that a significantly larger portion of Americans self-identify as partisans—about fifty percent—than as racial minority group members);
see also Christopher Devine, Even Self-Identified Independents Are Partisan in America,
SOC. SCI. SPACE (Nov. 2, 2018), https://www.socialsciencespace.com/2018/11/even-self-iden
tified-independents-are-partisan-in-america/ [https://perma.cc/9LU6-A5N7] (showing that
only about 10% of self-identified independents lack a predictable partisan affiliation). But
see Steven Webster, Partisan Geographic Sorting, SABATO’S CRYSTAL BALL (Dec. 15,
2016), http://crystalball.centerforpolitics.org/crystalball/articles/partisan-geographic-sorting/
[https://perma.cc/9V2M-XT7E] (demonstrating that Americans increasingly cluster in ideo
logically homogenous regions).
162
See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
163
See Michael Li & Thomas Wolf, 5 Things to Know About the Wisconsin Partisan Gerrymandering Case, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (June 19, 2017), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog
/5-things-know-about-wisconsin-partisan-gerrymandering-case [https://perma.cc/W9VF-DXBX]
(noting that Wisconsin, a battleground state with a fairly even popular vote split across the
state’s geographic regions, has a Republican-dominated and entrenched state legislature).
164
See id.; see also Robert Barnes, North Carolina’s Gerrymandered Map Is Unconstitutional, Judges Rule, and May Have to Be Redrawn Before Midterms, WASH. POST (Aug. 27,
2018, 9:50 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/2018/08/27/fc04e066
aa4611e8-b1da-ff7faa680710_story.html?utm_term=.ff07e97292a9 [https://perma.cc/7BSN
-52T2]; Ingraham, supra note 151.
165
See Ingraham, supra note 151 (explaining how Maryland line-drawers used the concentrated and highly Democratic D.C. Metro voters to dilute the votes of more-Republican
rural voters).
166
See Tokaji, supra note 9, at 784–85.
167
See id. at 787–88 (explaining that Anderson-Burdick analysis generally focuses on the
effect, not the intent of the particular election registration).
168
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“[T]he associational harm of a partisan gerrymander is distinct from vote dilution.”).

850

WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL

[Vol. 28:831

It is vote dilution, pervasive across the state as part of a partisan map, that “burden[s]
the ability of like-minded people across the State to affiliate in a political party and
carry out that organization’s activities and objects.”169 Justice Kagan’s concurrence
considers a state where associational rights of a party member are burdened, even
though votes in a number of districts are not diluted in a way that diminishes the
effectiveness of a particular party.170 In defense of this theory, Justice Kagan is transparently creating a means for plaintiffs who do not reside in packed or cracked districts,
such as Professor Whitford and Mary Lynne Donohue in this action,171 to be able to
bring cases analogous to the complaint in Gill v. Whitford.172
2. An Associational Harm-Only Regime Undermines the Individuality of Voting
Rights
In creating an unnecessarily formal distinction between vote dilution and associational harms, Justice Kagan treads on the right that the majority opinion holds
sacrosanct: the individuality of the right to vote.173 Chief Justice Roberts is correct
in the notion that the right to vote is one acknowledged as intimately personal in our
country’s history and tradition.174 For the merits of Justice Kagan attempting to find
a means to amplify the harm of a single voter into a package-deal harm suffered by
an association of voters, she does so in a manner that is at odds with the Court’s
long line of precedent treating voting as an individual right.175
First, Justice Kagan’s theory of the party-activist harm leaves too open the
potential of manufactured injury to create standing, which the Court has treated with
harsh distaste.176 Justice Kagan supposes if a districting plan ravages the party of
which a state citizen is an active member, she may suffer a burden even if her vote is
unchanged.177 While the party activist harm is likely very real, it is hard to imagine that
the Court would be willing to establish a judicially manageable standard to discern
between a sufficiently active party member and a voter who volunteered a handful
of instances in order to create this “activist injury.”178
Second, the concurrence incorrectly assumes that political parties have a magnified associational right to associate effectively.179 Justice Kagan asserted that, if there
169

Id. at 1939.
Id. at 1938 (explaining that less electoral opportunity stemming from an unfavorably gerrymandered map will hurt a party’s ability to fundraise, recruit, etc.).
171
Id. at 1933 (majority opinion).
172
See id. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring).
173
See id. at 1929 (majority opinion).
174
See id.; Fishkin, supra note 157, at 1332–59 (explaining the various intangible benefits
the right to vote provides beyond the ability to influence the outcome of an election).
175
See supra text accompanying notes 31–34.
176
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013).
177
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring).
178
See Clapper, 568 U.S. at 402.
179
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1939 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“The complaint in [an associational
170
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is a burden on the associational rights of party activists, that burden “may be doubly
true for party officials and triply true for the party itself (or for related organizations).”180 To make this assertion, Justice Kagan referenced California Democratic
Party v. Jones,181 in which the Court found an associational right belonging to political
parties.182 However, this is a misapplication of the precedent set forth in Jones. As it did
in Jones,183 the Court has repeatedly found an associational right of political parties
to determine their membership in interparty activities, such as primaries and conventions.184 However, the Court has not found that a political party’s right to associate
extends to the ability to actually win seats in a general election or to govern upon
having a representative majority.185 The right to cast an effective ballot is not a right
belonging to an association, but one that fundamentally rests in the individual.186 The
associational right of the party extends to the arena in which it is determining its membership, rules, and policies, but this does not reach to winning general elections. 187
Justice Kagan’s standing theory thus fails on two grounds. First, her analysis
makes an erroneous formalist distinction between vote dilution and associational
rights of voters, and second, her associational rights of parties ignores the individual
nature of the vote. However, Justice Kagan’s analysis is not to be wholly discounted.
partisan gerrymandering] case is . . . that the gerrymander has burdened the ability of like-minded
people across the State to affiliate in a political party and carry out that organization’s activities and objects.”).
180
Id.
181
Id. at 1938.
182
California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567 (2000).
183
See id. (holding that, though states have the right to regulate the structure of party
primaries, the California “blanket primary” oversteps the state’s role as regulating the public
aspect of elections). The Court determined that primaries are also a private affair in which
parties must have the capacity to associate freely to determine their candidate for the general
election. See id.
184
See generally Tashjian v. Republican Party of Conn., 479 U.S. 208 (1986) (determining
that parties have the power to determine their association by allowing open primaries to
increase those with a voice in the party’s association); Democratic Party of the U.S. v. Wis. ex
rel. La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981) (determining that the freedom of association of a state
party’s convention delegation can be governed to an extent by state law, but ultimately the
national party’s rules may still control the convention voting rights of the delegation’s members); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (holding that the national party can determine
the membership of a state delegation over the state’s laws); O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1
(1972) (holding that political parties are voluntary associations of people that can solve their
membership disputes internally at events like conventions).
185
Samuel Issacharoff, Private Parties with Public Purposes: Political Parties, Associational
Freedoms, and Partisan Competition, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 274 (2001) (discussing the general
rights of political parties the Supreme Court has acknowledged over time).
186
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929 (“We have long recognized that a person’s right to vote is ‘individual and personal in nature.’”(quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1962))).
187
See cases cited supra note 184 (identifying a survey of cases in which the Court has
identified the breadth of a political party’s associational rights).
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The Gill concurrence sets a course for acknowledging the connection between partisan gerrymandering and associational harms. Alas, the theory set forth by Justice
Kagan supposes that associational harms may stand alone from vote dilution,188 when,
in reality, the two harms are best understood in conjunction.
C. The Gill v. Whitford Standing Theories Are Fatally Flawed
This Section has demonstrated the pervasive failures of the partisan gerrymandering standing theories set forth in the majority and concurring opinions in Gill v.
Whitford. The majority theory, as elaborated by Chief Justice Roberts, incorrectly
makes logical analogues between racial vote dilution and partisan gerrymandering
in limiting the injury of partisan gerrymandering cases to the harm of vote dilution.189
Furthermore, the majority’s insistence on demonstrating district-by-district injury fails
to recognize the statewide reality of partisan gerrymandering.190 Though purporting
to desire a statewide remedy, Justice Kagan reinforces the majority’s erroneous
belief that each state legislative district exists in an ecosystem free and distinct from
every other.191 Her concurrence created a false dichotomy between vote dilution and
the freedom of association, a distinction that ignores the relationship the two injuries
have that reinforce one another.192 Lastly, in her valiant effort to create a statewide
claim and remedy for partisan gerrymandering, Justice Kagan provided a freedom
of association framework that troublingly creates voting rights claims independent
of the individual voting rights of any specific voter.193
The failures of these two theories of partisan gerrymandering are too pervasive
to reform. Rather, the Court needs to radically reimagine its partisan gerrymandering
standing jurisprudence by acknowledging that voting is an individual right that manifests itself in an associational expression. There are salvageable aspects of the Gill
standing theories put forth by the majority and concurrence, but standing alone, these
theories will prevent the actual delivery of justice to plaintiffs who have been invidiously discriminated against because of their political affiliation.
IV. PROVIDING A WORKABLE ALTERNATIVE: THE FRAMEWORK
OF THE ANDERSON-BURDICK TEST
In Part IV, this Note advocates for reframing injury-in-fact for partisan gerrymandering cases based on the connected relationship of First and Fourteenth
Amendment harms. First, Section A lays out the contours of the Anderson-Burdick
188
189
190
191
192
193

Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring).
See discussion supra Section III.A.1.
See discussion supra Section III.A.2.
See discussion supra Section III.B.
See discussion supra Section III.B.1.
See discussion supra Section III.B.2.
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analysis and how it should apply to claims of partisan gerrymandering.194 Next,
Section B demonstrates the ways the Anderson-Burdick analysis improves upon the
Chief Justice’s individualized injury formula as elaborated in the Gill majority opinion.195 Lastly, Section C explains the improvements the Anderson-Burdick standing
inquiry makes upon Justice Kagan’s theory of associational harm.196
A. The Anderson-Burdick Test and Partisan Gerrymandering
It is important to note at the outset of this analysis that the Anderson-Burdick test
is not generally applied for standing analysis, but for determining whether a specific
regulation or law on the topic of voting rights is in violation of a constitutional right.197
Therefore, the application of the Anderson-Burdick standard as proposed in this
Section is not directly analogous to the way in which the test is applied in precedential cases.198 Rather, the Anderson-Burdick test as it may apply to partisan gerrymandering allows plaintiffs to demonstrate a compound constitutional injury resulting
from state action, which, when taken together, would allow a plaintiff to bring both
district-specific and statewide challenges to partisan districting maps.199
The intersection between the First and Fourteenth Amendment rights in electoral
regulation is not a novel idea.200 The Court has previously acknowledged that there
can be a connection between these two constitutional rights and that it is implicated
in voting rights claims related to party affiliation.201 The Anderson-Burdick test
provides the framework for such claims. If plaintiffs can show injury upon their First
and Fourteenth Amendment rights “to associate for the advancement of political
beliefs, and the right of qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to
cast their votes effectively,” then they have demonstrated injury-in-fact for Article
194

See discussion infra Section IV.A.
See discussion infra Section IV.B.
196
See discussion infra Section IV.C.
197
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 428–29 (1992) (applying the standard to Hawaii’s
ban on write-in candidates to determine that it burdened the right to vote and associate for
the benefit of a write-in candidate); see also Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 780–81
(1983) (determining that Ohio’s early registration requirement for independent candidates
prevented independent voters from associating for an effect on the political process).
198
See discussion supra Section I.C.
199
I acknowledge that the distinction between the harm alleged in a standing claim and
the actual merits of a claim can grow hazy in instances of discrimination. See Heckler v.
Matthews, 465 U.S. 728, 729 (1984); see also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 206–08 (1962);
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). Nonetheless, the injury demonstration bar
should be lowered to afford plaintiffs the opportunity to develop a factual record to prove actual
discrimination. The Anderson-Burdick test, though originally designed for the deliberation
of the merits, is useful to consider the scope of a plaintiff’s alleged injury.
200
See discussion supra Section I.C.
201
See sources cited supra note 184.
195
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III standing.202 The application of the Anderson-Burdick test is desirable because it
lowers the bar for plaintiffs to bring partisan gerrymandering cases—which allows
voters to remedy the political process breakdown—but the test still respects the
difficult decisions the state government has to make in drawing legislative districts.203
The application of this test will not allow every plaintiff in every state under each
new decennial map to show that she has suffered injury to her right to effectively
cast her vote,204 but it will overcome the unnecessarily expensive and mechanical
system the Court demands in Gill.205
Questions of partisan gerrymandering have proven difficult for the Court because
jurists have erroneously considered the scope of these claims as analogous to Baker
“one person, one vote” claims and their progeny.206 Alternatively, as Justice Kennedy
identified in Vieth and Justice Kagan proposed in Gill, partisan gerrymandering
injuries may arise from a strict First Amendment freedom of association claim.207
However, both of these standards ignore the reality of partisan gerrymandering.208
Mapmakers, when engaging in partisan gerrymandering, classify voters based on
their political affiliation and then use that classification to harm the electoral efficacy
of the opposing partisan association.209 Thus, the harm “cracked” and “packed” plaintiffs bring is twofold. The Court has been loath to find that an individual’s First or
Fourteenth Amendment harms alone rise to the requisite standing injury requirement.210 Perhaps this jurisprudence is correct; taken individually, neither harm may
be cognizably sufficient to be an Article III case or controversy. However, considered
through the lens of the Anderson-Burdick test, which combines the constitutional
considerations of both Amendments, the compounded harm to individual and associational rights may be ample standing injury.
202

See Anderson, 460 U.S. at 787 (quoting Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968));
see also Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
203
See Tokaji, supra note 9, at 784 (“[The Anderson-Burdick test] also captures the necessity
of scrutinizing the specific interests proffered by the State in support of its restrictions, with
stronger interests required to justify greater burdens.”).
204
See id. at 784.
205
See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934 (2018) (remanding the case for plaintiffs
to show individualized injury in fact); see also Amended Complaint, Whitford v. Gill, No.
15-cv-421-jdp (W.D. Wis. Sept. 14, 2018) (adding plaintiffs to the original suit to bring the
complaining party up to forty Wisconsin citizens in order to show the injuries sustained in
each alleged gerrymandered district).
206
See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1930–31.
207
Id. at 1938–39 (Kagan, J., concurring).
208
See sources cited supra notes 163–64.
209
Christopher Ingraham, This Is the Best Explanation of Gerrymandering You Will Ever
See, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2015, 9:06 AM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp
/2015/03/01/this-is-the-best-explanation-of-gerrymandering-you-will-ever-see/?utm_term
=.24e7cadac13e [https://perma.cc/EN86-HJG9].
210
See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1938–39 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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Generally stated, the Equal Protection Clause prohibits government-sanctioned
action that treats people unequally.211 By classifying people based on their political
affiliation and using that classification to determine that some people do not deserve
an equal opportunity to cast a meaningfully determinative vote, partisan gerrymandering implicates some concern under the Equal Protection Clause.212 Discrimination
and diminished capacity to participate equally in a state-sanctioned system are sufficient injuries to give rise to a claim under the Clause.213
Furthermore, the Equal Protection Clause protects against disparate treatment
with regard to fundamental rights.214 Though acknowledging “voting is of the most
fundamental significance under our constitutional structure,”215 the Court has properly
acknowledged that some role of electoral regulation is necessary if “[elections] are
to be fair and honest and if some sort of order, rather than chaos, is to accompany
the democratic processes.”216 Thus, restrictions on the fundamental right to vote are
tolerated to some degree and do not give way to the immediate application of strict
scrutiny.217 District line drawing, like issues of ballot access, voter I.D. requirements,
and write-in campaigns, implicates a state need to regulate free and fair elections.218
Thus, an individual voter in this scheme could not show harm by demonstrating that
she has been placed in a district she does not like.219 Rather, under the AndersonBurdick test, she would have to show first that she suffered injury to her right to be
treated equally in the electoral process, and then show that the state lacked valid
justification for such unequal treatment.220 State interest in electoral management
receives great deference, so this standard would not open litigious floodgates.221
The Equal Protection harm is only half of the injury suffered by cracked and
packed voters. Justices Kennedy and Kagan have identified the other harm associated with partisan gerrymandering: the right to associate as protected by the First
Amendment.222 Though not garnering a majority of the Court in Vieth or Gill,
Justices Kennedy and Kagan’s acknowledgment that “voting is a form of expressive
211

City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985) (internal citations
omitted).
212
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 161–62 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
213
See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 738 (1984).
214
See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
215
Ill. State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 184 (1979).
216
Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974).
217
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 433 (1992).
218
See id.
219
See id. (contemplating a balancing test for election regulations that considers state
interest).
220
Id. at 434.
221
See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 204–05 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Burdens are severe only if they go beyond the merely inconvenient.”).
222
See discussion supra Section II.C.
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association protected by the First Amendment” is a concept that Supreme Court
majorities have repeatedly adopted.223 The right to associate in electoral politics
belongs to members of major parties as well as independents.224 The First Amendment protects voters’ rights to “associate together to express their support for [someone’s] candidacy and the views he espouse[s].”225 Though by itself fundamental to
the right to vote, the First Amendment right to associate is intimately intertwined
with the Fourteenth Amendment right to equal protection as well.
Constitutional guarantees do not all exist distinct from one another, but rather
interact in an ecosystem of rights and privileges that provide the foundation of a free
citizenry in a democratic society.226 Partisan gerrymandering implicates “multiple
constitutional claims that gain meaning when heard together and amplify the cognizable harm.”227 The First and Fourteenth Amendment injuries suffered by gerrymandered plaintiffs may be incoherent or nebulous when considered alone, but these
harms become more cognizable when “the constitutional provisions are read to inform
and bolster one another.”228 The Court has failed by treating these harms distinctly,
and has thus created an unreasonably high hurdle for plaintiffs to show standing.
The Anderson-Burdick test, in contemplating both the Equal Protection and expressive/associative harms voters suffer, allows plaintiffs to combine these “intersectional
rights”229 into impairment sufficient to demonstrate Article III standing. This framework
does not just allow plaintiffs to more easily access the federal judiciary to address a
political process breakdown,230 but also it provides a cognizable means for the courts
to consider the complex and interlaced issues associated with electoral regulations.231
But what does a partisan gerrymandering claim under the Anderson-Burdick test
look like? This analysis demands a “two-track approach”232 in which the presiding
court must first consider whether the burden imposes “severe” or “reasonable, nondiscriminatory restrictions.”233 A frivolous partisan gerrymandering claim would end
at this first inquiry. Given the strict one person, one vote restriction the Supreme
223

Tokaji, supra note 9, at 771–84 (providing a survey of cases in which the Court has
ruled on the associative rights of voting).
224
See id.
225
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 806 (1983).
226
See Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, 97 B.U.
L. REV. 1309, 1313–16 (2017).
227
Id. at 1330.
228
Id. at 1313.
229
See id.
230
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1929 (2018) (“At argument on appeal in this case,
counsel for the plaintiffs argued that this Court can address the problem of partisan gerrymandering because it must: The Court should exercise its power here because it is the ‘only institution
in the United States’ capable of ‘solv[ing] this problem.’”).
231
See Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 434 (1992).
232
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 205 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring).
233
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
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Court has demanded of state legislature districts,234 state legislatures will necessarily
be given some latitude in line drawing. If an alleged gerrymander is determined nondiscriminatory, “the State’s important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to
justify . . . restrictions.”235 Anderson-Burdick gerrymandering plaintiffs would have
the burden of showing that the regulation was sufficiently severe or discriminatory as
to cause them harm.236 In cases like Wisconsin and North Carolina, where there is
overt evidence of attempted Republican vote maximization,237 this initial inquiry may
not be difficult. Given that the demonstration of injury—severe or reasonable—is
the dispositive question in standing analysis, the Anderson-Burdick test would solve the
Court’s gerrymandering standing problem on its first prong. The inquiry into whether
this harm is minimal enough to protect the “competing interest” of the government’s
role in regulating elections is left to the Court’s resolution on the merits.238
A major benefit of using the Anderson-Burdick analysis is that it allows states
some latitude in drawing lines while still acknowledging that some voters will
necessarily suffer some injury to association or voting power from a districting
scheme.239 This analysis provides important improvement on existing partisan gerrymandering standing analysis: it allows for statewide, rather than district-by-district
inquiry. By implicating the First Amendment right to freely associate, the AndersonBurdick test allows a single plaintiff’s proposed harm to transcend district lines.240
Associational harms are “not district specific”—if the valued association exists statewide, “the proof needed for standing should not be district specific either.”241
Using the Anderson-Burdick test for understanding the harm caused by partisan
gerrymandering provides three major benefits to courts, plaintiffs, and states. First,
the test allows plaintiffs to synthesize their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights to
indicate an intersectional injury perhaps more palatable to courts than the existing
Equal Protection analysis for gerrymandering. Second, Anderson-Burdick recognizes
the role states have in regulating elections and thus allows states a powerful rebuttal
234

See Lyle Denniston, Argument Preview: How to Measure “One Person, One Vote,”
SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 1, 2015, 12:19 AM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2015/12/argument
-preview-how-to-measure-one-person-one-vote/ [https://perma.cc/7Q4Y-R947].
235
Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788 (1983).
236
See Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434.
237
See Armand Emamdjomeh et al., Why North Carolina’s House District Lines Have
Been Upended—Again, WASH. POST (Aug. 31, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com
/graphics/2018/politics/north-carolina-redistricting/ [https://perma.cc/D4Y7-4YXZ] (“‘I think
electing Republicans is better than electing Democrats,’ said Rep. David Lewis, a Republican
member of the North Carolina General Assembly, addressing fellow legislators when they
passed the plan in 2016. ‘So I drew this map to help foster what I think is better for the country.’”); see also supra notes 163–64.
238
Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181, 210 (2008) (Souter, J., dissenting).
239
Burdick, 504 U.S. at 433.
240
See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1938–39 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
241
Id. at 1939.
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to alleged plaintiff injury. Lastly, the Anderson-Burdick test allows for statewide
consideration of rights and injury that more accurately reflects the realities of partisan
gerrymandering. In Sections IV.B and IV.C, this Note demonstrates the improvements this test makes on the Gill majority and concurrence standing analyses.242
B. The Anderson-Burdick Analysis Corrects the Flaws of the Majority’s Standing
Theory
Although Chief Justice Roberts is correct that Supreme Court jurisprudence is
predicated on the concept that “a person’s right to vote is ‘individual and personal
in nature,’”243 partisan gerrymandering goes further than encroaching only on the
right for an individual to vote. The Chief Justice concluded his analysis in Gill by
restating the Article III mandate to the federal courts to “vindicate the individual
rights of the people appearing before it.”244 The plaintiffs, determined the Chief
Justice, had failed to show this individuality, finding that “[this] is a case about
group political interests, not individual legal rights.”245
Yet, the Chief Justice fails to address the fact that the Court has long acknowledged the individual’s right to form a group for the advancement of political
interests.246 Rather than allow a group of plaintiffs in a state to bring a statewide
claim against a partisan district map that disfavors them and their ability to organize
with similarly minded voters, the Chief Justice demands a plaintiff-representative
from every offending district.247 This requirement places an illogical burden on
individual plaintiffs to bring what amounts to a gerrymandering class action.248 By
demanding a hyper-individualized standing analysis for what has been demonstrated
to be a simultaneously individual and associative right,249 the Chief Justice has
required lower courts to make incredibly piecemeal and mathematical inquiries into
partisan intent and effect. The Anderson-Burdick analysis improves on this archaic
formula by allowing evidence of statewide partisan intent to harm a class of voters
to demonstrate injury to voters’ rights.250 The proposed inquiry does not require
242

See discussion infra Sections IV.B–C.
Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964)).
244
Id. at 1933.
245
Id.
246
See Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 793–94 (1983).
247
See sources cited supra note 205 and accompanying parentheticals.
248
See Marc E. Elias (@marceelias), TWITTER (June 18, 2018, 7:36 AM), https://twitter.com
marceelias/status/1008720179545731072?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw%7Ctwcamp%5Etweetembed
7Ctwterm%5E1008720179545731072&ref_url=https%3A%2F%2Fwww.vox.com%2F2018
2F6%2F18%2F17474912%2Fsupreme-court-gerrymandering-gill-whitford-wisconsin [https://
perma.cc/S2SA-JD4C] (“In light of today’s SCOTUS decision in Gill, it seems that the most
logical (and perhaps the only) plaintiffs with standing to bring a statewide partisan gerrymandering claim are the political parties (or quasi-parties, like certain partisan superpacs).”).
249
See discussion supra Section IV.A.
250
See supra notes 224–36 and accompanying text.
243
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plaintiffs from each district in a state to undertake the costly, intimidating, and timeconsuming process of litigation in order to remedy the violation of fundamental
voting rights that are irreparable via the normal political process.
C. The Anderson-Burdick Analysis Is Superior to Justice Kagan’s Associational
Harm Theory
Justice Kagan’s alternative theory for standing based on association harm for party
activists is a falsely formalist “distinct” harm that is derivative of the statewide harm
experienced by claimants under the rights-integrating Anderson-Burdick test.251 As explained at length in Section III.B, Justice Kagan’s proposed theory ignores prerequisite Equal Protection violations whereby voters are classified before suffering their
respective associative injuries.252 Justice Kagan incorrectly viewed the associative
harm suffered by political activists and organizations to be distinct from the gerrymandering of any specific district and believed that party activists and organizations
have a better standing claim than loyal party voters.253 This is flawed in two regards that
are remedied by the alternative Anderson-Burdick analysis: (1) voting is an individual right,254 and (2) voters should not manufacture injury for Article III standing.255
First, Justice Kagan, in an attempt to allow statewide evidence to demonstrate
partisan gerrymanders, determined that political parties and associations may suffer
the requisite injury in fact to their organizational goals.256 While this may be true,
allowing parties, rather than individuals, to fight in court for the individual’s right
to associate puts the cart before the horse. The Anderson-Burdick test allows an
individual to assert her right to associate in a political organization without discrimination, which retains the right to vote in the individual. This analysis is more consistent
with the longstanding jurisprudence that “a person’s right to vote is ‘individual and
personal in nature.’”257
Second, the Anderson-Burdick test, unlike Justice Kagan’s standing analysis, does
not encourage loyal party voters to manufacture injury. Justice Kagan posited that the
active party member may have standing to challenge a statewide map, which could
encourage would-be plaintiffs to volunteer for their party in order to gain access to the
courts.258 This is both uneconomic and at odds with standing jurisprudence.259 The
Anderson-Burdick test circumvents the unnecessary step proposed by Justice Kagan.
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259

Tokaji, supra note 9, at 783–84.
See discussion supra Section III.B.
See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1939 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring).
Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964).
See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 402 (2013).
Gill, 138 St. Ct. at 1937 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 1929 (majority opinion) (quoting Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 561).
See id. at 1938–39 (Kagan, J., concurring).
See discussion supra Section III.B.2.
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So long as an individual voter can show severe burdens on her ability to associate
equally under the right to vote, she can assert a claim against a statewide gerrymander.
V. CHALLENGES TO THE ANDERSON-BURDICK ANALYSIS
There are countless potential challenges to the analysis provided above, ranging
from those who believe that partisan gerrymandering is permissible under our constitutional structure to those who may take issue with this Note’s choice of AndersonBurdick to remedy the problem of pervasive political districting. Both the corruptions
and justiciability of partisan gerrymandering generally has been implied in the preceding Sections, and a more in-depth analysis of these arguments would be beyond
the scope of this Note. So, this Part focuses on the more specific challenges levied
against the Anderson-Burdick test specifically.
While courts have regularly applied the Anderson-Burdick test for a litany of
voting rights questions in the decades since its inception, the test is not without its
critics in scholarship.260 This Part addresses two potential challenges to the application of the Anderson-Burdick test to partisan gerrymandering: (1) that the focus on
the individual in gerrymandering is misplaced,261 and (2) that the Anderson-Burdick
test should be scrapped entirely for a more explicit inquiry into partisan intent.262
A. Tokaji: Anderson-Burdick Should Concern Parties, Not Individuals
Daniel Tokaji criticizes the modern application of the Anderson-Burdick test as
having lost sight of the associative rights of political parties initially concerning that
line of cases.263 Tokaji argues that “a focus on political parties would also best capture
the injury that underlies [Anderson-Burdick] plaintiffs’ claims.”264 For practically all
modern restrictions on voting, Tokaji claims, the goal is “partisan manipulation, designed to help the dominant major party at the expense of its main competitor.”265
The standard Tokaji proffers is a simple amendment to Anderson-Burdick: “The greater
the disparate impact on voters affiliated with the non-dominant party, the stronger
the State’s justification should be.”266 Applied to partisan gerrymandering, Tokaji’s
standard would consider injury as the extent to which the district map injured any
plaintiffs’ ability to associate, balanced against a sliding scale of state interest.267
260

See Tokaji, supra note 9, at 786–91; see also Edward B. Foley, Essay, Voting Rules
and Constitutional Law, 81 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1836 (2013).
261
See discussion infra Section V.A.
262
See discussion infra Section V.B.
263
See Tokaji, supra note 9, at 786.
264
See id.
265
Id.
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Id. at 787–88.
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See id. at 786–88.

2020]

NOT GILL-TY

861

While an interesting cosmetic alteration to the process of Anderson-Burdick,
Tokaji’s test fails to improve on the proposed application of Anderson-Burdick in
partisan gerrymandering cases specifically. Though conceptually intriguing, Tokaji
fails to provide a test that would be more palatable for adjudicating partisan gerrymandering tests.268 Furthermore, his test, to a lesser extent than Justice Kagan’s,269
still shifts the focus of voting rights too far from the individual.
The Supreme Court has struggled to find a justiciable test for partisan gerrymandering since Bandemer.270 The Anderson-Burdick test is particularly attractive to remedy
this problem because it has a fairly clear, two-tiered scrutiny analysis illuminated
by precedential guideposts.271 Tokaji’s test would leave too much guesswork in the
hands of the fact-finder to determine how much partisan injury should be balanced
against the state interest. The vagueness of the standard treads towards unworkability,
a position many justices have already taken in regard to partisan gerrymandering.272
Though Anderson-Burdick provides a sliding scale analysis, it maintains fairly clear
standards to guide the presiding judge.273 Tokaji’s test lacks these standards.
In addition, Tokaji contemplates that voting restrictions should be viewed
through the lens of partisan manipulation and party effect.274 While this argument
has merit, it muddies the water as to whether individual plaintiffs alone may have
injury-in-fact to challenge voting restrictions. Like Justice Kagan’s associational analysis, this formulation is in conflict with the foundational understanding that voting
is an individual right.275
B. Foley: Explicit Inquiry of Partisan Intent
Professor Edward Foley provides an inquiry on the other side of the coin as
Tokaji’s partisan effect analysis. Foley argues that courts should abandon the “current
morass”276 of balancing voting rights and state regulatory power; “[i]nstead of attempting to measure burdens and interests, perhaps federal judges should ask whether the
state’s administration of the voting process is a ploy to achieve a partisan advantage.”277 For him, the question is not whether a state actor was particularly effective in
an effort to discriminate against the opposing party, but merely if it attempted such
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discrimination.278 A major benefit to this analysis that Foley acknowledges is its
predictability: “Lawyers would know that their task would be to introduce, or refute,
evidence of partisan bias, rather than guessing about how to weigh competing and
immeasurable values or what qualifies as arbitrary.”279
Again, this critique of Anderson-Burdick is certainly intriguing, but it leaves
much to be desired. First, Foley’s test would contemplate a cognizable claim even
where plaintiffs faced no discernable injury.280 Second, as how courts have occasionally struggled to discern racial intent,281 courts may have difficulty determining partisan
intent from circumstantial evidence.
If a map was intended to be a partisan gerrymander, but was actually ineffective
at achieving partisan goals, it would still give rise to a cause of action under Foley’s
formulation.282 This is problematic for standing analyses, as a plaintiff may only bring
an Article III case or controversy when she can show injury in fact.283 Thus, Foley’s
test fails to provide a clear formulation of injury as Anderson-Burdick can.284 Given
that standing proves a substantial hurdle for gerrymandering plaintiffs, Foley’s test
seems wholly inapplicable to this realm of election law.
Foley confidently states that the partisan intent inquiry would be a reprieve from
the “current morass” posed by the Anderson-Burdick balancing test.285 However, it is
not so clear that an intent inquiry would provide any more bright a line than the current survey.286 Legislatures can hide their intent in the broad swaths of power that
states are provided in regulating elections.287 Given the constitutional directive of
election oversight to the states, courts may be loath to read a partisan intent into
278
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facially neutral statutes.288 Though Foley believes this intent analysis will free litigants
from the muddled inquiries of Anderson-Burdick, it may instead subject litigants to
a battle of vague circumstantial evidence resulting in difficult questions of great
political implication left to finders of fact. The Anderson-Burdick analysis, on the other
hand, allows for greater structure in defining the factual record, and it is less susceptible to factual manipulation by state actors.
In sum, although there are compelling challenges to Anderson-Burdick for purposes of many election regulations, the test this Note proffers is superior in its ability
to define the contours of injuries suffered by individual voters and provides a workable standard to a judiciary that has been unwilling to define a new test for such a
politically important question.
CONCLUSION
The Court has struggled for decades to grapple with the extent to which it should
enter the “political thicket”289 of partisan gerrymandering, ultimately deciding in
June 2019 that it would not hear such political questions.290 Even before Rucho, the
Gill majority, in rejecting the compelling mathematical evidence that a statewide
map entrenched Republican representatives, demonstrated this persistent fear in adjudicating politically sensitive questions of partisan gerrymanders.291 The two standing
analyses provided by the Gill Court, however, are at odds with the realities of partisan
gerrymandering and the Court’s approach to state restrictions on voting rights.292
The Anderson-Burdick test, first iterated in 1983 and crystallized in 1992, is a
decades-old test the Court has applied to a variety of challenges to voting restrictions.293 Though never before applied in a question of gerrymandering, the test provides
a compelling framework for determining how partisan maps disfavor and injure individual voters.294 In subjecting voting restrictions to a two-tiered analysis that considers
both First and Fourteenth Amendment rights implicated in voting, the AndersonBurdick test effectively protects voters from state overreach while insulating states
from frivolous court cases.295 Rather than look to new formulations for determining
what amounts to a cognizable injury in fact, the Supreme Court, as well as state
courts now shouldered with the burden of solving this process failure, should look
to the precedential past to find the answer for the partisan gerrymandering puzzle
in the Anderson-Burdick analysis.
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As partisanship and gridlock intensify across the country, the political process
has broken down to a degree where voters are incapable of resolving the perversions
of partisan districting through the traditional electoral means. The Supreme Court
“can address the problem of partisan gerrymandering because it must”296—because,
as Paul Smith, counsel for the Wisconsin plaintiffs in Gill argued: “[The Supreme
Court is] the only institution in the United States that can . . . solve this problem just
as democracy is about to get worse because of the way gerrymandering is getting so
much worse.”297 While Smith’s plea for action ultimately fell on deaf ears, his impassioned request now echoes in the chambers of state courts and the halls of Congress,
which should consider the intertwined speech and equality concerns inherent to
issues of partisan gerrymandering.
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